Peace and the Logic of Occupation

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• Introduction

In October 2001 the United States of America and its allies went to war with the autocratic Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Following the defeat of the Taliban, the US-led coalition began a nation-building project in Afghanistan with the goal of establishing a democratic system of government. In 2007 at a meeting between President Bush and Afghan President Hamid Karzai, President Bush summarized the reasons for the United State’s invasion of Afghanistan in the following way: “It's in the interests of the United States that we continue to help you. It's in our security interests that this democracy flourish, because when freedom takes place in Afghanistan, it can set an example for what's possible in other parts of the broader Middle East. When people see that there's hope in a part of the world that has been ravaged by war and have been terrorized by brutal extremists, when people realize there's a different way of life, they'll demand the same things. And it's peace that we all want, and it's liberty that will help us achieve that peace.”

In March 2003 another coalition led by the United States went to war against the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and following the collapse of the Iraqi regime, the United States and its allies began the process of guiding Iraq to democracy. On November 26, 2007 President Bush and the democratically-elected Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki of the Republic of Iraq jointly issued the Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America in which both heads of state acknowledged the “the heroic sacrifices made by the Iraqi people and the American people for the sake of a free, democratic, pluralistic, federal, and unified Iraq”.

The Afghan and Iraqi cases share an important similarity: in each case the United States went to war in order to overthrow an autocratic regime and replace it with a democratic one. The Bush administration was pursuing a policy of social re-engineering whereby countries were made more peaceful by transforming them into democratic societies. The Bush policies of social re-engineering have caused great interest in the academic community. In “Ensuring Peace: Foreign-Imposed Regime Change and Postwar Peace Duration, 1914-2001 ” Nigel Lo, Barry Hashimoto, and Dan Reiter (LHR) provide the intellectual underpinning for the social re-engineering policies of the Bush White House by formulating what I call the logic of social re-engineering.

Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter’s logic of social re-engineering proceeds in the following steps. They begin by asserting that peace following a war breaks down because the terms of the cease-fire that ended the war have been violated. The best way to ensure peace after a war, according to LHR, is for the victorious state to impose a new regime on the defeated state. An instance where one state imposes a regime on another state is called foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) by LHR, and there are two mechanisms that operate in a FIRC that cause a FIRC to re-engineer a society so as to make it more peaceful. The first mechanism is a change of foreign policy preferences. The second mechanism is the transformation of domestic political institutions. Together these two mechanisms cause the state that had a regime imposed on it to be less likely
to violate the terms of the ceasefire agreement because its foreign policy preferences and the institutions that create and act on those preferences have been re-engineered.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. First, I lay out the causal logic offered by Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter to explain the pacifying nature of foreign-imposed regimes and describe their evidence. Second, I counter their argument by presenting an alternate causal logic that explains the pacifying nature of imposed regimes. I call this logic the logic of occupation, and I argue that it is the martial force of military occupations that accounts for the pacifying effects that Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter ascribe to FIRCs. Third, I call LHR’s statistical findings into question by eliminating a number of cases as not being an instance of FIRC. Fourth, I provide an over-view of each case from their dataset and argue that the logic of social re-engineering is not present in a majority of the cases that they base their findings on and that it is instead the logic of occupation which is at work. In the handful instances where the logic of social re-engineering is present, I argue that it is secondary to the logic of occupation. Finally I provide in the Appendix a more in-depth study of each of the sixteen cases that were summarized in the previous section to offer more support for my argument that it is occupation which has the effect of making peace following a war endure.

• The Logic and Evidence behind Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter’s Claims

The Logic

At the center of Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter’s argument that a foreign-imposed regime is the best way to ensure peace following a militarized dispute lies the following claim: “the breakdown of postwar peace means that one of the belligerents has violated its commitment to war-ending peace settlement”. In order to prevent one of the belligerents, specifically the belligerent who was defeated, from violating its commitment to the peace that ended the war, LHR propose that the society of the defeated state be engineered such that it is more peaceful. This social re-engineering is best facilitated by a imposing a new regime on the defeated state. LHR provide two mechanisms through which foreign-imposed regime change ensures the maintenance of postwar peace. The first mechanism is changing foreign policy preferences of the defeated state. A state imposing a regime can change foreign policy preferences by through a number of channels. LHR argue that preferences can be changed “by executing, imprisoning, or exiling militarist leaders and their supporters, breaking up pro-war or pro-empire industrial cartels, revamping hypernationalist educational curricula, keeping hypernationalist/militarist statements and publications out of the public sphere, and/or empowering or importing leaders with more compliant and/or peaceful foreign policy preferences”. The second mechanism is transformation of political institutions. By imposing a new regime, the victor can change the very nature of the system of government of the defeated state. LHR conceptualize such a transformation being facilitated by the defeated state being “forced to hardwire pacifism into their constitutions or laws, for example, such as renouncing war, banning the deployment of troops outside the
national borders, and/or accepting limits on the size and/or weaponry of the armed forces.” The victor could also replace autocratic institutions with democratic ones as a means of transforming political institutions. As LHR point out, “some political leaders (and scholars) believe that democratic states are more pacific for a variety of reasons: their elected leaders are constrained from starting wars by war-averse publics, greater transparency enables democracies to resolve crises short of war, and democracies embrace nonviolent norms of conflict-resolution.”

The Evidence

Based on these causal logics, Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter formulate two testable hypotheses: 1) peace following interstate war lasts longer when the war ends with one state suffering foreign-imposed regime change and 2) the pacifying effect of foreign-imposed regime change establishing a puppet regime, which is a government that is under the control of another state, diminishes over time. The second hypothesis is based on the claim that a puppet regime is less effective in maintaining peace because “eventual leadership change in both the victor (puppet-master) and defeated (puppet) state increase the likelihood that the defeated state will be allowed to pursue an independent foreign policy.” On the other hand, if a democratic regime is installed “the effects of imposed democratization (or democracy-FIRC) should be more stable over time, as such regimes’ institutions have been, in theory, permanently transformed to be more pacific. Further, a democratic FIRC is likely to have been imposed by a democratic victor, and democracies tend to create more stable and mutually acceptable postwar orders through reliance on multilateralism and the exercise of restraint.”

In order to test their hypotheses Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter test their two hypotheses using statistical analysis. They compile a dataset of the more than 200 cease-fires from 1914 to 2001 and then coded 136 of these cease-fires. For each cease-fire between a pair of states LHR determines the length of time in days from when the cease-fire entered into force until the cease-fire fails, by which they mean a renewal of war. To code for a foreign-imposed regime change Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter rely on two datasets: the ARCHIGOS dataset and a dataset developed by Suzanne Werner. The ARCHIGOS dataset contains information about all national leaders from 1875 to 2004 including the nature of the leader’s ascension to power, and LHR code for foreign-imposed regime change when ARCHIGOS coded a leader as being directly deposed by another state. Werner looks at the time period from 1816 to 1980 and takes a more comprehensive approach to coding foreign-imposed regime change. She coded a state as experiencing a foreign-imposed regime change if there was a change in leadership within a year of a war’s end, if the victor of the war played a role in determining the nature of the loser’s regime, and if the regime reflects foreign rather than domestic preferences. Ultimately Lo,
Hashimoto, and Reiter coded a state has having experienced a foreign-imposed regime change if the victorious state of the war played a strong role in determining the losing state’s new regime.

This coding yields thirty-three foreign-imposed regimes from the ARCHIGOS dataset and thirty-seven foreign-imposed regimes from the Werner dataset. Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter find that in the instances when a cease-fire is not accompanied by a foreign-imposed regime it fails thirty-five percent of the time for the ARCHIGOS data and thirty-four percent for the Werner data. On the other hand, when the cease-fire is accompanied by a foreign imposed regime the cease-fire fails in six percent of the cases from the ARCHIGOS dataset and in eleven percent of the cases from the Werner dataset.

The significance of these results is highlighted when they are compared with the results of the significance tests conducted by Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter of other possible explanations for the duration of postwar peace. Some of these variables are present in the existing literature on the causes of postwar peace duration, and LHR are interested in demonstrating that their explanation of postwar peace duration as caused by a foreign-imposed regime change is the only statistically significant explanation. For example, Suzanne Werner argues that war-ending cease-fires reflect the balance of power between the belligerents at the end of the war, and thus when the balance of power is altered after the war the state that experiences a gain in relative power has a greater incentive to break the peace and resume the war. To represent this argument LHR included a measure of annual defense outlays as a means of measuring the balance of power between states in their analysis. They found that this measure was not statistically significant, meaning that the balance of power does not affect the duration of postwar peace. Virginia Page Fortna contends that robust cease-fires cause the peace following a war to last longer. LHR include an “agreement strength” variable in their analysis to represent Fortna’s argument and found that it too is statistically insignificant. Suzanne Werner and Amy Yuen examine the effect of the information environment during the war on postwar peace duration. They argue that when one side consistently wins battles during a war, both sides gain a more accurate understanding of the balance of power that exists between them. This realistic understanding of the balance of power makes postwar peace last longer than it otherwise would. Werner and Yuen also argue that if a war is interrupted by a third-party postwar peace will not last as long because the belligerents do not have as much information about the balance of power as reflected in battle outcomes. LHR run an analysis of both a battle consistency and interrupted war variable. The interrupted war variable was not statistically significant, and although LHR report that the battle consistency variable was statistically significant, they do not provide any further explanation. Other variables that LHR tested for statistical significance include change in capabilities, post-1945 agreement, formalism, demilitarized zone, arms control, peacekeeping, stakes, and conflict history. Of all of these other variables, only certain confidence building measures in addition to battle consistency had a statistically significant impact on postwar peace duration. These statistical findings reinforce LHR’s logic that foreign-imposed regime change is the most effective way to make peace following a war endure.
Summary

Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter argue that the most successful way to ensure that postwar peace lasts is to engineer the defeated state’s society such that it is less likely to violate the terms of the war-ending cease-fire. This engineering is best facilitated by the victor imposing a new regime on the defeated state, and two causal mechanisms operate after the imposition of a new regime which decrease the likelihood that the state will violate the terms of the cease-fire. These mechanisms are the alteration of foreign policy preferences and the transformation of domestic political institutions. After deriving two hypotheses from their causal logic, LHR run a series of statistical analyses to test these hypotheses to see if they are supported by the data derived from coding 136 cease-fires. Not only do LHR find support for their hypothesis that foreign-imposed regime change makes postwar peace last longer, but they also are able to show that a number of other possible explanations for the duration of postwar peace are not statistically significant.

Counter to Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter’s Logic and Evidence

The Logic of Occupation

Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter claim that foreign-imposed regime change is the most effective way to make sure that peace following a war will last. I will show that it is military occupation which makes postwar peace endure through what I call the logic of occupation. While LHR do not explicitly address the logic behind the pacifying effects of military occupation, they do allude to it. Recall that the underlying claim of their argument is that “the breakdown of postwar peace means that one of the belligerents has violated its commitment to war-ending peace settlement.” They immediately follow this sentence with the following: “However, when one state suffers foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) at war’s end, the de facto removal of that state’s foreign policy sovereignty substantially reduces the chances that it will violate its war-ending commitment to peace, making postwar peace duration last longer”. Recall that change in foreign policy preferences and transformation of domestic political institutions are the two mechanisms by which LHR propose to explain how foreign-imposed regime change has the effect of re-engineering a society such that it is more peaceful. De facto removal of a state’s foreign policy sovereignty is not included in the two mechanisms. Social re-engineering would not be the means to pursue the removal of a state’s foreign policy sovereignty. Rather, an imposed regime that is under the control of the foreign state that imposed the regime, what LHR call a “puppet FIRC”, would be capable of achieving a de facto removal of a state’s foreign policy sovereignty. However Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter ultimately subordinate the effects of a foreign-imposed puppet to the effects of a democratic foreign-imposed regime and instead focus solely on their social re-engineering argument.

I argue that it is the logic of occupation, which Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter refer to but ultimately ignore, that is responsible for the pacifying effect that LHR attribute to foreign-imposed regimes. Why is military occupation necessary to ensure that postwar peace lasts? For the simple reason
that it is the only way to ensure that a state will not act in such a way as to violate the terms of
the war-ending cease-fire. Foreign policy sovereignty is one of the primary components of what
it is to be an independent state. Therefore, a state will not willingly accede to the loss of its
ability to conduct its foreign affairs at it chooses. This is precisely why LHR argue that puppet-
FIRCs are so unstable; states want to act independently. Martial force is the only means strong
enough to act as a counter-weight to a state’s desire to act as it likes. States do not like to engage
in war because states want to survive and the outcome of wars is always uncertain. In the
instance of military occupation, if the occupied state were to antagonize its occupier sufficiently
there would be renewed war to once again subdue the defeated state. Thus the threat of force is
the mechanism by which peace is maintained. It is reasonable to conclude that foreign-imposed
regime change would be accompanied by occupation. Instances of foreign-imposed regime
change happen following the defeat of one state by another state during a war. Wars are
prosecuted with the use of armies. Therefore, if one state is defeated in a war by another state, it
is logical to assume that the defeated state will be occupied by the victor’s army. It is similarly
logical to conclude that the victorious state, after imposing a regime on its defeated rival, would
leave a force behind. The victor would do this because of the possibility that the new regime will
not have the effect of preventing the violation of the war-ending cease-fire agreement through
dangerous foreign policy decisions.

The Evidence

The table below of instances of foreign-imposed regime change as coded by ARCHIGOS
and Werner was created using Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter’s dataset. The name given to each
FIRC reflects the name used in the dataset.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Pair</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country Pair</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK- Turkey</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Italy - Ethiopia</td>
<td>1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany - Poland</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Germany - Poland</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia - Poland</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Germany - Netherlands</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany - Belgium</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Germany - Belgium</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany - Norway</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Germany - Norway</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany - France</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Germany - Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy - Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Germany - Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany - Greece</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Germany - Greece</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy - Greece</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia - Romania</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia - Hungary</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>(Allied Control Comm.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US - Germany</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>US - Germany</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK - Germany</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>UK - Germany</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia - Germany</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Russia - Germany</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France - Germany</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>France - Germany</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US - Japan</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>US - Japan</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR - Belgium WWII</td>
<td></td>
<td>GDR - Belgium WWII</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR - Greece WWII</td>
<td></td>
<td>GDR - Greece WWII</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR - Netherlands WWII</td>
<td></td>
<td>GDR - Netherlands WWII</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note that Werner’s and ARCHIGOS’s different coding criteria for foreign-imposed regime change led ARCHIGOS to exclude the following instances of FIRC that Werner included in her dataset: UK-Turkey 1918, Germany-France 1940, Russia-Romania 1944, Russia-Hungary 1945 (Allied Control Commission).

On the face of it, LHR have identified thirty-seven instances of foreign-imposed regime change from the Werner dataset and thirty-three instances of foreign-imposed regime change. Below I provide a number of reasons for why certain cases should be excluded from LHR’s dataset. The result of removing these cases leaves only a handful of cases of actual instances of foreign-imposed regime change upon which LHR can base their argument.

Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter’s treat cease-fires as taking place between two states. This means that in those cases where there were multiple parties to a cease-fire they had to be broken up into
pairs of states, and as foreign-imposed regime change accompanies a cease-fire this means that they are broken down into state pairs. This causes the instance of the cease-fire between Nazi Germany and the Allies at the end of the Second World War to provide four different instances of foreign-imposed regime change: US-Germany, Russia-Germany, UK-Germany, and France-Germany. This disaggregation does not make sense. The target of foreign-imposed regime change is the government of the defeated state, and states only have one government. Therefore there can only be one instance of foreign-imposed regime change per state, regardless of how many states participate in changing that state’s government. To take the current example, it does not make sense to talk about the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France all imposing separate regimes on the one government of Germany. However, Germany was ultimately divided into the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. Therefore it is reasonable to argue that two states imposed a regime on each of the two different German states because the two German states had separate governments. The two countries that can be considered as legitimately imposing a regime on the two German states are the United States and the Soviet Union. The instances of the United Kingdom and France may therefore be excluded from the final number of cases of foreign-imposed regime change, leaving thirty-five cases remaining in the Werner dataset and thirty-one in the ARCHIGOS dataset.

Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter include fourteen instances where either the German Democratic Republic or the Federal Republic of Germany participated in some capacity in a foreign-imposed regime. Based on the labeling of these cases from LHR’s dataset, one can conclude that all of these cases are associated with the Second World War. However, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany did not exist until 1949, four years after the Second World War ended. It is impossible for a state that did not exist to either impose a regime on another state or to have a regime imposed on it. Therefore these fourteen cases also must be excluded from the final number of foreign-imposed regime change. When these cases are excluded from the Werner dataset there are twenty-one FIRCs remaining and when they are excluded from the ARCHIGOS dataset there are seventeen FIRCs remaining.

Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter use a number of foreign-imposed regimes that occurred during the Second World War and involve either Nazi Germany and its allies or the Soviet Union. These cases, however, are not actually instances of foreign-imposed regime change. Instead they are examples of conquest. A discussion of the Axis and Soviet policies towards the countries that they defeated during the Second World War is taken up below in the case studies, but a brief discussion here is necessary. Neither the Axis nor the Soviets were interested in pursuing the sort of social re-engineering that Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter provide as the mechanism for how foreign-imposed regimes make postwar peace last longer. Rather the Nazis and their allies were interested in the short term in securing resources for their war effort and in the long term with creating their new European order; the Soviets wanted to regain territory lost at the end of the First World War. If a new government was established in the conquered territories, it was a government in name only, with real authority being exercised by the occupying power. Poland,
which is represented in the table as Germany-Poland 1939 and Russia-Poland 1939, is an excellent example of Nazi and Soviet dealings with the countries that they conquered in the course of the Second World War. Prior to invasion, Germany and the Soviet Union agreed to divide Poland between them. They invaded Poland up to the border between their two territories and defeated the Polish resistance. They then proceeded to directly annex Polish territory and, in the Nazi case, establish the quasi-state of the Generalgouvernement in south-central Poland, which amounted to a reservation for displaced Poles. Therefore, since these ten cases are not in fact instances of foreign-imposed regime change, they too should be excluded from the final list of actual FIRCs. For Werner this means that there are eleven FIRCs remaining. Germany-France 1941 is not included in the ARCHIGOS dataset, and therefore the list of Second World War FIRCs that need to be excluded from ARCHIGOS is nine instead of ten. This reduces the ARCHIGOS number to eight remaining FIRCs.

Soviet expansionism is also represented in Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter’s body of cases. The Soviets used the fact that their army was present throughout Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War to dictate what type of government was formed in the liberated territories. However, these new governments are not instances of foreign-imposed regime change as LHR consider it. The Soviets were interested in creating in ensuring their security vis-à-vis the West. Therefore they treated their satellite states essentially as occupied territories whose domestic governments were subordinate to the will of Moscow. In LHR’s body of cases, Russia-Romania 1944 and Russia-Hungary 1945 (Allied Control Comm.) represent the initial move by the Soviet Union to subjugate Eastern European states. The Russo-Hungarian instance represents the Soviet Union reiterating its control of Hungary. Therefore, these three should be excluded from the final number of instances of foreign-imposed regime change. This reduces the number of Werner FIRCs to eight, and as ARCHIGOS includes Russo-Hungarian but not Russia-Romania 1944 and Russia-Hungary 1945 (Allied Control Comm.) the number of ARCHIGOS FIRCs decreases to seven.

North Vietnam-South Vietnam is included in both the Werner and ARCHIGOS lists of foreign imposed regime change. Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter acknowledge that this is an instance of state death and they follow Fortna’s South Vietnam precedent of coding postwar peace duration to last for a day before being right-censored. As has already been discussed in the instances of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, it is not possible for there to be an imposed regime if a state does not exist. Following its victory at the end of the Vietnam War, North Vietnam reunified the country under a communist government. Where there were two states before the end of the war there was now just one state after the war. The South Vietnamese government ceased to exist. It is illogical to say that the North Vietnamese imposed a regime on a government that was not there. Therefore, the North Vietnam-South Vietnam is not an instance of foreign-regime change and should be excluded from the dataset. This brings Werner’s total remaining FIRCs to seven and ARCHIGOS to six.
Lo, Hashimoto, Reiter count as a foreign-imposed regime change the case labeled Italy-Ethiopia 1936. While the Italians did install a new government in Ethiopia, it was part of their overall colonization scheme in the Horn of Africa. The Italians went to war with the Ethiopians to make a colony out of them. It is natural that after the Ethiopians had been defeated that the Italians would install a new government, but this government was not sovereign. Rather it was an Italian governorship that was responsible to the Italian Ministry of Colonies. The Ethiopian government that existed prior to the Italian conquest was dissolved and was not reconstituted until after the Italians had been driven out of the country. Colonization is not synonymous with imposing a new regime; to colonize is to directly subordinate another state to external sovereignty. As the Ethiopian case is case of colonization and not merely imposing a new regime, it should be excluded from the list of actual instances of foreign-imposed regime change. This reduces the legitimate instances of FIRC in Werner’s dataset to six and the legitimate instances of FIRC in the ARCHIGOS dataset to five.

The following table summarizes the disqualifications made in the above section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Critique</th>
<th># of Werner FIRC$^*$s</th>
<th># of ARCHIGOS FIRC$^*$s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inappropriate disaggregation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIRC$^*$s with state that does not exist</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Death</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conquest</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Satellite</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The instances of legitimate FIRC that remain for Werner after the disqualifications are UK-Turkey 1918, US-Germany 1945, Russia-Germany 1945, US-Japan 1945, Ugandan-Tanzanian, and US-Afghanistan 2001. This is six out of the thirty-seven instances of foreign-imposed
regime change that she included in her original list. The instances of legitimate FIRC that remain for ARCHIGOS after the disqualifications are US-Germany 1945, Russia-Germany 1945, US-Japan 1945, Ugandan-Tanzanian, and US-Afghanistan 2001. This is five out of the thirty-three instances of foreign imposed regime change that were included in the original ARCHIGOS list.

The various grounds for disqualification from being considered a FIRC, such as state death, disaggregation of multiparty FIRCs, colonization, and conquest, result in the elimination of a significant number of cases upon which Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter base their argument that foreign-imposed regime change is the best means to make postwar peace last. The handful of cases that remain is so small that it calls into question the robustness of their findings.

Summary

The logic of occupation explains why occupations as opposed to foreign-imposed regime change are the most effective means of ensuring that postwar peace endures. War resumes after a cease-fire because one of the parties to the cease-fire acted in such a way as to violate the cease-fire’s terms. Therefore the most effective way to keep this from happening is to deny a state the ability to act independently in matters of foreign policy. However, states want to act independently and the only way to prevent them from doing so is to subdue them with military force. The hindrance to independent action is how military occupation extends the duration of postwar peace.

Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter base their argument that foreign-imposed regime change is the most effective means to ensure the duration postwar peace on two datasets compiled by Suzanne Werner and ARCHIGOS. These datasets, however, are rife with instances that are not actually cases of foreign-imposed regime change. Instead they are examples of conquest, colonization, disaggregation of multiparty ceasefires, or state death. Once these cases are excluded from the dataset of actual instances of foreign-imposed regime change, the Werner and ARCHIGOS datasets are reduced to six and five cases respectively. This small number of cases that contain actual examples of foreign-imposed regime change calls into question the robustness of LHR’s findings about the pacifying effects of foreign-imposed regime change.

• Case Studies

In the following section I provide summaries of the more detailed case studies that are located in the Appendix. I examined each case to determine if the country experienced occupation or social re-engineering. In every case I found that occupation was the dominant force. There are some cases where social re-engineering is present, but these limited instances of social re-engineering go hand-in-hand with occupation. In light of these findings, I conclude that it is occupation and not social re-engineering that keeps peace after the conclusion of war.

I set aside most of the objections made in the previous section to the characterization of a majority of cases found in the Werner and ARCHIGOS datasets as foreign-imposed regime
changes and provide a brief overview of the relevant history in each case. However, I do re-aggregate any cases that Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter disaggregated. I do this because no matter how many states participate in imposing a regime, there is only one government which can be changed through foreign intervention. Re-aggregating the cases results in sixteen countries that need to be studied to determine if occupation or social re-engineering is at work. In the following overview of the case studies, I group countries that had similar experiences together in order to highlight commonalities between cases that serve to support my argument that occupation makes peace last.

Conquest (Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, France, Yugoslavia, Greece)

The aims of the Axis powers during the Second World War affected the entire European continent. The Nazis and their allies initiated war against Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, France, Yugoslavia, and Greece. The attacked states were conquered and then subjected to occupation by Nazi forces, but not social re-engineering. Nazi occupation meant three things for the defeated states. First, it meant that the defeated state would lose either some or all of its territory. For example, following its defeat by the Nazis and Fascist Italians, Yugoslavia was totally dismantled and its territories divided up between Germany, Italy, and their minor allies such as Bulgaria and Romania. France saw Alsace and Lorraine virtually annexed to Germany.

The second characteristic of Axis occupation was economic exploitation. Germany had limited natural resources, and therefore one of the primary goals of the Nazis was to secure the materials to enable them to continue the prosecution of the war. One of the motivating reasons for the Nazi invasion of Norway was to secure iron ore. The Nazis were similarly interested in exploiting the mineral resources of Yugoslavia and Greece. As the Second World War continued, more and more German males were required to be soldiers. This created labor shortages and to solve these shortages the Nazis turned to the territories that they occupied. The Nazis implemented programs whereby males from the occupied territories were sent to work in German factories. This was especially the case in the Netherlands.

The third characteristic that the Nazi occupation of Europe exhibited was the creation of institutions in the conquered territories subservient to Berlin. In some cases this meant the establishment of a collaborationist regime, as was the case in Vichy France. In other cases, it meant the installation of a Reichskommissar, a German civil official who was appointed by Hitler to govern over the conquered territory, as was the case in Poland. On its face these institutions seem to be instances of foreign-imposed regime change. However, this is not the case. The Nazis did away with the legitimate governing bodies and instead replaced them with governments that were wholly dependent on the approval of the Nazis for any actions that they took. The Nazis did not seek to change the foreign policy preferences of the conquered states or to transform their domestic political institutions. The Nazis did not attempt to re-engineer society to make it more peaceful through a foreign-imposed regime per Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter’s model. Instead, the Nazis and their allies sole concern in the short term was to make sure that the
territories that they conquered remained subdued so as to ensure a steady supply of the means to continue the war effort and in the long term they were interested in incorporating these conquered lands into the new Europe.

**Cold War (Romania, Hungary)**

At the end of the Second World War, the Red Army of the Soviet Union occupied much of Eastern Europe. As the agreements between the Allies reached at the various conferences it was established that the Soviets would exercise influence over Eastern Europe, and Hungary and Romania fell into the Soviet sphere of influence. As the Cold War emerged, the Soviets were concerned with creating a system that would ensure the survival of the USSR. The Soviets used the presence of their troops as a lever to win greater and greater concessions from the domestic governments of the countries that the occupied until eventually the non-Communist government collapsed, as was the case in Romania. The Soviets then used their superior troop strength to back domestic Communist parties in their grab for power. They also did not hesitate to use their troops to suppress any sort of deviance from the line dictated by Moscow, as was the case in Hungary. The Soviets dictated to the Communist regimes of the satellite states the sort of reforms that needed to be implemented in order to transform society into a Communist society. These reforms, however, are not the same type of reforms that Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter propose for the re-engineering of society so that it is more peaceful. The Soviet Union was interested in making sure that its satellite states towed the Communist line, not in transforming their societies to peaceful democracies.

**State Death (Vietnam)**

The current state of Vietnam arose because of the death of the South Vietnamese state. Throughout the course of the Vietnam War it was clear that the United States was the sole reason for South Vietnam’s continued survival. It was equally clear that if the United States should leave the war without defeating the North Vietnamese it would only be a matter of time before the North overran the South. The United States left the war in 1973, and by 1975 the North had defeated the South. The death of South Vietnam meant that there was no independent society for the North Vietnamese to change the foreign policy preferences of, and it meant that there was no South Vietnamese government whose institutions the North Vietnamese could transform along the lines outlined by Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter. It is impossible to re-engineer something that no longer exists. Instead the North simply had to occupy the South until it acquiesced to rule by the North.

**Colonization (Ethiopia)**

Ethiopia had maintained its independence in the face of European attempts to colonize it for several decades. The Italians were ultimately able to bring their superior military technology to bear against the out-dated Ethiopian army and defeat them. Following the defeat of the Ethiopian army, the Italians implemented a massive colonization program whereby they
dissolved Ethiopia’s borders, merged Ethiopia with other Italian possessions in the Horn of Africa, and drew up plans for a massive program to re-settle Italians in Ethiopia. In order to maintain order, the Italians maintained a large military force in the colony. The Italians had no interest in re-engineering Ethiopian society along the lines drawn up by Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter. The Italians simply wanted to create a viable colony.

**Geo-Political (Turkey, Uganda)**

Turkey and Uganda share that they were occupied for purely geo-political reasons, which is to say that the occupiers had goals in mind that do not fall under category of social re-engineering. Entente troops were present in what was then the Ottoman Empire following its defeat in the First World War. There were several issues that needed to be resolved at the end of the First World War, such as the status of the Bosporus and Dardanelle Straits, the territories populated by Armenians, and the city of Mosul in Iraq. However, these issues are of geo-political interest only and in no way would the resolution of these issues affect any sort of social re-engineering of the sort argued for by Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter. In fact, the Entente powers fought against the forces that were fighting to make Turkey a democratic state.

Uganda was invaded and occupied by Tanzanian forces following an attempt by Uganda to annex border territory from Tanzania. The sole purpose of the Tanzanian occupation was to remove Idi Amin, the president of Uganda who was responsible for the Ugandan invasion of Tanzania. They did not try to alter the Ugandan political system to make it more pacifistic. Indeed the Ugandan political system kept functioning much as it had prior to the Tanzanian invasion, with one dictator followed by another.

**Occupation with Re-engineering (Germany, Japan, Afghanistan)**

Germany and Japan are the two countries that are always held up to demonstrate how social re-engineering can transform a belligerent state into a peaceful member of the international community, and it is the hope that the current actions in Afghanistan will transform the country in a similar fashion. In all three cases there was or is an effort to transform both the foreign policy preferences of the government and to transform political institutions, which are exactly the two mechanisms by which Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter propose that foreign-imposed regime change makes post war peace last longer.

There is no denying that there was social re-engineering that took place in both Germany and Japan. In both the German and Japanese constitutions there are provisions which make the prosecution of war by the state impossible. Indeed, Japan required loose interpretations of its constitution in order to be able to form a defense force. Re-education programs were also implemented in Germany and Japan. In Afghanistan a democratic government has been established and there is an active effort to ensure that these reforms endure.
At the same time that these social re-engineering projects were going on, Germany and Japan were simultaneously occupied by Allied forces. Although the western Allies agreed to end the state of war that they had declared against Germany, they still had to approve the unification of two German states following the end of the Cold War. Thus, Germany had a very practical reason for not wanting to go against the wishes of the United States for reasons beyond the fact that it had new democratic institutions. If it wanted to form a unified German state it needed to prove to the world that it would not be dangerous.

The restrictions placed on the nature of the Japanese defense force meant that Japan relied primarily on the United States to provide for its security. Therefore, Japan cannot afford to offend the United States as it provides the basis for the Japanese state’s continued existence. Beyond that, there is the very real fact that Japan simply does not have the military means to resist the United States even if it would want to.

In spite of the implementation of democratic reforms in Afghanistan, including the democratic formulation of a national constitution and democratic elections for the national government, military action is still on-going. Al Qaeda and Taliban forces are still active in the country and it is far from clear that if the United States and its allies were to withdraw their forces from the country that the new democratic regimes would remain in place. Therefore, the government has an incentive to maintain good relations with the United States and its allies if it would like to have a chance at remaining in power.

Although social re-engineering unquestionably took place in Germany, Japan, and Afghanistan, it is not the case that these social re-engineering measures are what is responsible for the peace that set in following the conclusion of the wars against these countries. Instead, Germany, Japan, and Afghanistan have existential reasons for not wanting to resume war against the United States and its allies because the United States has a special relationship to the security and continued existence of these countries.

Summary

The results of the previous section are summarized in the following table:

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<th>Case</th>
<th>Occupation?</th>
<th>Social Re-Engineering?</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
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After re-aggregating the cases found in the Werner and ARCHIGOS datasets there are sixteen countries which are considered having experienced a foreign-imposed regime change. Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter base their argument that social re-engineering through foreign-imposed regime change is the most effective means to ensure that postwar peace endures on these sixteen cases. However, it is not the logic of social re-engineering that operates exclusively in these cases to ensure the duration of peace. Rather, the logic of occupation is present in these cases, and it is this logic which explains the duration of postwar peace following the wars that these states were involved in. The collection of similar cases into groups allows the commonalities between the cases to be emphasized. These commonalities point to the operation of the logic of occupation as the means through which postwar peace is maintained.

• Conclusion

During his eight years as President of the United States George W. Bush pursued a foreign policy that was based on the idea that it is possible to socially re-engineer a state so that it is more peaceful. This idea of social re-engineering is what motivated the United States to invade Afghanistan and Iraq. It is also the idea behind Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter’s article entitled “Ensuring Peace: Foreign-Imposed Regime Change and Postwar Peace Duration, 1914-2001”. In this article LHR attempt to provide the causal mechanisms that operate when a state suffers a foreign-imposed regime change that have the effect of making a state more peaceful, which in turn makes postwar peace last longer. In addition to these logics, LHR also provide statistical findings which offer robust support for their argument.

I offer a counter-logic to Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter’s logic and argue that only a military occupation is sufficient to ensure that a state does not violate the terms of a war-ending cease-fire agreement. I call this the logic of occupation, and mechanism through which the logic of occupation functions is the mechanism of military force. This logic is more compelling than the logic of social re-engineering because military force is the only means strong enough to counter the desire of states to act independently. I attack the cases upon which Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter base their argument in two ways. First I demonstrate that a majority of cases should in fact be excluded from the dataset of foreign-imposed regime change because they are not actually instances of foreign-imposed regime change. Instead they are examples of conquest, state death, colonization, or include states that were not in existence. The result of these disqualified cases is to show that Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter’s finding rest on only a handful of cases and therefore it is not possible to claim that their finding is robust. The second way that I call their finding into question is by analyzing each case in-depth and demonstrating that in all of LHR’s cases it the logic of military occupation operates, and that in the limited number of cases where the logic of social re-engineering is present, it is subordinated to the logic of occupation. Together with the logic of occupation itself, the analysis of the data used by Lo, Hashimoto and Reiter clearly demonstrates that the logic of occupation is the explanation for the duration of postwar peace.
After the Entente defeated the Ottoman Empire, it was interested in achieving geopolitical goals and not in socially re-engineering Ottoman society through the imposition of a new regime.

The Ottoman Empire along with its allies was defeated at the end of the First World War and on 31 October, 1918 it capitulated in the Armistice of Murdos. The Armistice contained 25 Articles which provided for the military occupation of the Turkish Straits and other geo-political matter that were of interest to the Entente. Nowhere in the armistice was there any mention of transforming Ottoman society. The Sultan and his government in Istanbul did not want to see the Empire dismantled by the land-hungry European Great Powers and therefore were convinced that they needed to cooperate with the Entente as much as possible, especially the British, in order to ensure favorable terms in the negotiated peace treaty. This behavior only served to anger the Turkish nationalists. Beginning in 1919 Mustafa Kemal Pashta (Kemal Atatürk, founder of the modern Turkish state) started to coordinate with other nationalists to organize a political movement against the sultan. They began coordinate meetings of national congresses which, among other things, stated that they would resist any attempt to divide up the Empire. The rift between the nationalists and the government of the Sultan was such that in the spring of 1920 the chief müftü, or expert on religious law, of the Ottoman Empire issued a legal opinion in which he declared all nationalists rebels whom every faithful believer should attempt to kill.

In February 1920 the Ottoman parliament adopted “the National Pact” which stated that the territories inhabited by an Ottoman Muslim majority formed “an indivisible whole”, and on 16 March 1920 the British occupied Istanbul. The Treaty of Sèvres between the Ottomans and the Entente was concluded on 10 August 1920 and it created an Ottoman state that was only a pale shadow of what it had once been. By the time that the peace treaty was signed developments in Anatolia had made it clear to the Entente that the sultan’s signature of the peace treaty had little meaning and that the terms of the settlement would have to be imposed on a country that was already largely in the hands of the militant national movement. This is what motivated the British
to occupy Istanbul in March. However, the Entente powers were unwilling to fully occupy the country in order to enforce the terms of the peace, so they turned to Greece to enforce the treaty by military means.

The Greek military campaign was met with initial success but then suffered a series of defeats at the hands of the nationalist Turk forces. The Greek army was defeated by August of 1922, and leaving the British alone in their occupation of Istanbul. An armistice was concluded on 10 October 1922 which left the British in control of both the city and the Straits, and negotiations for a new peace treaty were held. The Entente bargaining position was greatly weakened by the fact that none of them were willing to commit troops to go to war over the Ottoman issue. On 21 August 1923 the new peace treaty, the Treaty of Lausanne, was concluded. This new treaty can be viewed as a success for the nationalists in which they were able to successfully overturn the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres.

The motivation behind the Entente’s demands on the defeated Ottoman Empire was geo-political in nature. The Entente wanted to gain territory at the expense of the Empire, and they wanted to see to it that the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits were kept open. They had no interests beyond these goals, and they were not interested in re-engineering Ottoman society through the imposition of a new regime.

**Ethiopia**

Target: Ethiopia  
Imposer: Italy  
Occupation: Yes  
Social Re-engineering: No

Ethiopia was conquered by Italy. The Italians then implemented procedures aimed not at the social re-engineering of Ethiopia, but rather at the colonization of Ethiopia.

Ethiopia was one of the few African nations that were able to stave-off the force of European imperialism. Indeed Ethiopia had already defeated an Italian attempt to conquer it and had concluded two treaties with Italy which confirmed Ethiopia’s territorial integrity. Ethiopian Emperor Selassie attempted to modernize the Ethiopian army, and while he had moderate success, the colonial powers that surrounded Ethiopia placed limits on the amount of arms that could be imported into the country. This made it challenging for Ethiopia to patrol its borders, and beginning in 1925 the Italians began encroaching on Ethiopian territory.

In December 1934 Mussolini concluded that he needed to invade Ethiopia before the Germans accumulated enough power to hinder Italian expansionism. The Italians assured French
neutrality in the matter in early January 1935, and on 3 October 1935 Mussolini ordered an invasion of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian forces were not able to fend off the superiorly-armed Italian army, and on 2 May 1936 Emperor Selassie fled the country as his army was defeated.

On 9 May 1936 Mussolini proclaimed the Ethiopian-Italian Empire. The next month a constitution was promulgated that joined the newly conquered Ethiopian territories with Italy’s other colonies in the Horn of Africa, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, to form Italian East Africa. By November 1938 Italian East Africa was divided into six semi-autonomous governorships. To control this new colony, an occupation army of 150,000 troops was initially deployed, but due to increasing indigenous unrest by 1940-41 the number of troops stationed in Italian East Africa had risen to 250,000 troops. Italy formulated plans to colonize Ethiopia and developed a program to settle as many as 6,250,000 Italians in the colony, and it was hoped that Ethiopia would transform into the model colony through planned settlement. However by the time Italy declared war on the Allies this program did not go according to plan due to indigenous resistance groups and ineffective land distribution.

The Italians declared war on the Allies on 10 June 1941, and following the Italian declaration of war, the British sent a mixed force of Europeans and Africans to Ethiopia to liberate it from the Italians as a means to secure the Suez Canal. The Allied force was very successful against the Italian troops, and on 5 May 1941 the Emperor returned to the Ethiopian capital of Addis Abada. After the British victory there was the danger that Ethiopia would become another British colony or protectorate, but Emperor Sellassie was able to negotiate the Addis Abada Agreement of 31 January 1942 whereby Ethiopia was acknowledge as a sovereign state, and by the spring of 1948 the last British troops had left Ethiopia.

Ethiopia is very clearly an instance of European colonization and is not an instance of social re-engineering. Italy was embittered after its defeat at the hands of the Ethiopians, and Mussolini took the earliest opportunity that he had to make another attempt at colonization. After the Italians had subdued the Ethiopian people, they dissolved the territorial boundaries of the country. They had plans for a massive influx of Italian settlers, and they had the armed forces to maintain the colonial government. None of these plans can be understood as an attempt at the social re-engineering of Ethiopian society as they were very clearly aimed at the creation of a colony.

Poland

Target: Poland
Imposer: Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union
Occupation: Yes
Social re-engineering: No
Following the First World War Poland re-emerged from over a century of non-existence, but it was not long before it was once again threatened by its neighbors. Prior to the beginning of the Second World War Poland resisted Soviet efforts to include Poland in security agreements because the Communist demands associated with these agreements amounted to the practical loss of Polish sovereignty. In a move similar to the earlier Partitions of Poland, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany concluded the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact on 23 August 1939 which divided Eastern Europe between the Soviets and the Nazis. Shortly after the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, on 1 September 1939 the Nazis unleashed the Blitzkrieg on Poland and inaugurated the Second World War. The Soviets followed suit and invaded Poland on 17 September, and on 12 October Hitler declared Poland to be an occupied territory. The Polish state was dismantled, eastern Poland was occupied by the Communists, and western and central Poland was controlled by the Germans. The western and northern parts of the territory occupied by the Germans were directly annexed to the Nazi Reich while in the south-central part of the territory the Generalgouvernement was established. The Generalgouvernement was under the leadership of Hans Franck, and all Poles who lived in the territories that were directly annexed to the Reich were forced to move to the Generalgouvernement. The leader of the Polish Fascist movement came forward and offered to form a collaborationist government, but in April 1940 Hitler forbade any possibility of creating a nominally autonomous Poland. Soviet troops entered the German zone of the former Poland in June of 1944 in their drive to Berlin, and as they liberated Polish territory the Soviets hand-picked Communists to head the Polish Committee of National Liberation. Following the war a provisional government was formed that was pluralistic. However, the presence of the Red Army gave the Polish Communist Party the upper hand, and in the elections that were held on 19 January 1947 the Polish Communist Party won a majority of the vote. The Polish Communist Party eventually forced the Socialists to join the United Polish Workers’ Party, and following the merger this party would rule Poland until the collapse of Communism in 1989. In this period of Soviet dominance the Polish army was reformed in the Soviet image to the point where Soviet officers were appointed to the Polish army. Following Stalin’s death, the Polish government was able to regain some power, but this was only after they proved that they would not challenge Soviet supremacy or threaten Soviet military interests.

After a brief two decades of existence, Poland ceased to exist once more following the Nazi and Soviet invasion of the fall of 1939. Poland was literally carved between the two aggressors with some of the territory being directly annexed while a semi-autonomous regime was created in the remaining territory. The Nazis had no interest in even maintaining the ruse of sovereignty, as is easily seen in Hitler’s refusal to allow the Polish Fascists to establish a collaborationist regime. There can be no doubt that during the Second World War that Poland was occupied by both the Nazis and the Soviets. Similarly, it is equally beyond question that as soon as the Nazi troops were driven out of Poland the political system that they had established collapsed. For the time
from the end of the Second World War until 1989 Poland was under the thumb of the Soviet Union. Although the Soviets did opt for the establishment of a collaborationist regime, they still exercised control over the Polish government, especially in security matters. In a fate similar to the Nazi political structure, as soon as it became clear at the end of the 1980’s that the Soviet Union would not move to re-establish control over the Polish government through the use of force should it deviate from the Communist line, the communist Polish regime collapsed.

The Netherlands

Target: The Netherlands

Imposer: Nazi Germany

Occupation: Yes

Social re-engineering: No

Learning from the First World War, Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands announced strict neutrality on 28 August 1939. Unfortunately for the Queen and her subjects, the Nazis had laid plans for the invasion of the Netherlands as early as March 1939. On 10 May 1940 the Nazis implemented a Blitzkrieg against the Netherlands, and by 14 May the major fighting had ceased. Queen Wilhelmina and her government fled The Hague for Britain on 13 May 1940 and there they established a robust Dutch government-in-exile. The Dutch commander-in-chief Winkelman capitulated to the Germans at Rijsoord on 15 May 1940, and with that a Nazi military government began. Approximately a year later, on 17 May 1941 Hitler ended the military administration and instead ordered that a Reichskommissar take over the government of the Netherlands in a fashion similar to that adopted in Norway. It was difficult for The Nazis had in mind the ultimate goal of incorporating the Netherlands as the province of Westland in the new Nazi continental order, but during the war the Nazis were primarily concerned with securing a potential base of operations against Great Britain and in ensuring that the Nazi war effort was provided for sufficiently. To this end 148,000 males were transported to work in Germany in some capacity. The Allies landed at Normandy on 6 June 1944, and by September 1944 the Allies had reached the Netherlands. At this point roughly 60,000 members of the Nazi Party in the Netherlands fled. The Nazis were driven out of the Netherlands by Allied forces, and a cease-fire was declared on 25 April 1945. Following the defeat of the Nazis and their flight from the Netherlands, mass arrests of between 120,000 to 150,000 people who were suspected of collaborating with the Nazis took place. These arrests were accompanied by purges of government officials at both the national and local level and in many private and public institutions.

The Nazi occupation of the Netherlands was not as brutal as some. However, following the flight of the Queen and the government to Britain and the capitulation of the Dutch army, the Nazis did
not waste any time in establishing an occupation government, which took the form of a military administration in the early stages of the Dutch occupation and evolved into the government of a Reichskommissar. In keeping with their general occupation policies, the Nazis forced Dutch males of appropriate age to go work in Germany, and they drew up plans for the permanent end of the Dutch state as the territory of the Netherlands was incorporated into the greater Nazi Reich as a province. The occupational government of the Netherlands collapsed as the Allies drove the Nazi army out, and after the war anyone who was suspected of collaborating with the occupiers was subject to strict scrutiny.

Belgium

Target: Belgium

Imposer: Nazi Germany

Occupation: Yes

Social re-engineering: No

The Belgians had already been invaded by the Germans during the First World War, and despite attempts to prevent this from happening, the Nazis launched a Blitzkrieg against the Belgians on 10 May 1940, simultaneously with the attack on the Netherlands. The Belgians did not have any more success defending themselves against the Nazis, and on 27 May 1940 King Leopold capitulated to the Nazis. The king decided to remain in Belgium and so Prime Minister Pierlot and Foreign Minister Spaak fled to Britain, where they established the Belgian government-in-exile. Even before the Belgians had formally capitulated the Nazis began to divide up Belgium as they saw fit. The Eupen, Malmédy, and Moresnet districts of Belgium were directly annexed to Nazi Germany on 18 May 1940. Leon Degrelle’s Rexist movement among the French-speaking Belgians and the Flemish DEVLAG, the two right-wing parties in Belgium, supported the Nazi occupiers. During the Nazi occupation Belgium was first governed by General Alexander von Falkenhausen. This military government was in place until July 1944 when Falkenhausen was replaced by Reichskommissar Josef Grohe, and it was at this point that the Nazis drew up plans to divide Belgium into two provinces (or Reichsgau): the Reichsgau Vlaanderen and the Reichsgau Wallonia. These two provinces were then to be annexed to Germany in a fashion similar to the Belgian districts that were annexed to Germany immediately following the beginning of Nazi aggression against Belgium. The liberation of Belgium from the Nazis began in September of 1944. The Allied advance was temporarily delayed by the Battle of the Bulge, but following the defeat of the Nazis at the end of the Battle of the Bulge the Nazis were driven out of Belgium by January 1945. Following the liberation of Belgium, members of the Rexist movement and other related organizations were put on trial. All told 57,052 individuals were...
prosecuted between 1944 and 1949 for various collaborationist activities. Of these 53,005 were found guilty.

The Nazi’s plans to initially annex certain districts of Belgium and then later to make the entirety of Belgium a part of the Reich was a death-blow to Belgium’s territorial sovereignty and could only be carried out with the presence of occupational armed forces. The fate of the Rexist and other right-wing groups following the departure of Nazi troops is the most telling sign that the occupational regime which the right-winged Belgians supported only was able to function because it was being propped up by soldiers.

Norway

Target: Norway

Imposer: Nazi Germany

Occupation: Yes

Social re-engineering: No

On the eve of the Second World War the Norwegian armed forces were not able to execute the same active defense of Norway’s neutrality as they had during the First World War and the Norwegians largely relied on the United Kingdom to guarantee their security. However, the Germans were able to launch a rapid attack on Norway that began on 8 April 1940. The following day the Nazis entered Oslo, but not before the king and government had managed to escape the city. On the 10th of April the Germans presented his demands to the king, and after the king refused the government and he fled to Britain, where they formed the Norwegian government-in-exile. On 24 April 1940 Josef Terboven was appointed Reichskommissar of Norway. There were repeated attempts to form a government to replace the one that had fled to Great Britain, but after these attempts failed Vidkun Quisling, the leader of the National Socialist Party in Norway, was appointed the head of a provisional government. On 1 February 1942 this arrangement was formalized as a government was established under Terboven’s control with Quisling as Minister-President. One of the primary reasons for the Nazi invasion of Norway was to ensure that the Reich had access to a supply of iron ore and other metals, and approximately 40 percent of Norwegian economic output was diverted to the Nazi’s war effort. The Nazis attempted to implement a plan to send 70,000 Norwegian men to Germany but this effort was thwarted by the Norwegian resistance. At the end of the war 350,000 German troops surrendered in Norway without offering any resistance. After the conclusion of the war, the Norwegians were determined to punish anyone who had collaborated in any way with the Nazis and in the end approximately 60,000 individuals and their families were subjected to legal or social penalties for their collaborationist activities.
France

Target: France

Imposer: Nazi Germany

Occupation: Yes

Social re-engineering: No

Following the Nazi offensive in Poland in the fall of 1939 France and the United Kingdom declared war on Nazi Germany. After that it was only a matter of time before the Nazis turned their attention from the eastern front to the western. The western Nazi offensive against France began on 10 May 1940, and the French line at Dinant and Sedan broke on the 13th of May. On 23 June the British government announced that it no longer considered France to be a sovereign country, and on 25 June the French-German cease-fire went into effect. It was decided that the best way to proceed with the governance of occupied France was to establish a French regime that had the appearance of sovereignty (among other benefits, the use of French manpower freed up Nazi manpower for other tasks). To this end Marshal Philippe Petain, the hero of the Battle of Verdun, established a French government in the city of Vichy on 1 July 1940. He made no secret of his alignment towards the occupying power of the Nazis, as he made clear in a speech on 31 October 1940 “it is with honour, and in order to maintain French unity… that in the framework of an activity which will create the European new order I today enter the road of collaboration”. The Vichy regime even used the persecution of Jews as a means of appeasing the Nazis. The French army was also limited to 100,000 troops and the French fleet that was still in French ports was demobilized. After defeating France the Nazis occupied two-thirds of the country, including the entire Atlantic coast, Paris, and the north of France. Alsace and Lorraine were essentially annexed to Germany proper. The departments of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais were placed under the German administration headquartered in Brussels. A large part of northeastern France was designated for “German colonization”. Theoretically the Vichy regime was sovereign over all of France, but the fact of the matter was that the Germans controlled the territory that they occupied more or less directly, and exercised enormous influence over the territories that were not directly occupied by them. By 1943 15% of agricultural production and 40% of industrial output was exported to Nazi Germany. French payments in 1943 are estimated to account for 36.6% of the country’s national income, and taking into account the demand from the occupying forces, approximately one-third of the French labor force was engaged in satisfying the occupier’s needs. The Allied invasion of Italy prompted the Nazis to violate the terms of the cease-fire and enter the region of southern France which was under the jurisdiction of the Vichy regime. The Allies landed on the beaches of Normandy on 6 June 1944 and Paris was liberated on 25th of August. As the Allies advanced across France, the Vichy government was first made to move to eastern France and ultimately into Germany itself. In the period when there was no authority to maintain law and order, it is estimated that as many 10,000 suspected collaborators were
summarily executed. After the rule of law was re-established, another 7,037 death sentences were handed down, and 1,500 were carried out. Over 40,000 receive prison sentences, and an additional 50,000 were deprived of civil rights. Laval and Petain, the two figures most associated with the Vichy regime, were sentenced to death. Laval was executed by Petain was granted a reprieve due to his advanced age. Additionally, 20,000 civil servants were purged from government due to collaborationist activities.

France’s vehement revolt against the Nazis as soon as they were able to do so is the archetype of what happens when a foreign-imposed regime change is no longer supported by armed forces. Indeed, the French contribution to the fight against the Nazis was such that the Allies treated liberated France not as a collaborationist state, but rather as a co-belligerent.

Yugoslavia

Target: Yugoslavia
Imposer: Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy
Occupation: Yes
Social re-engineering: No

Yugoslavia was attacked by the Axis on 6 April 1941 and was overrun in short order, surrendering on the 17th of April. Following the defeat of the Yugoslav forces, the patchwork country of Yugoslavia was completely dismembered per directives issued by the German Supreme Command on the 12th of April. Slovenia was divided between Germany and Italy. The Dalmatian and Montenegrin coast was ceded to Italy. Yugoslav border territories were given to Hungary while Kosovo and western Macedonia was given to Italian Albania. Bulgaria occupied what remained of Macedonia, Italy occupied Montenegro, and Germany occupied all of Serbia. Additionally the Independent State of Croatia was created and was governed by a collaborationist regime. While there were a number of states that participated in the partitioning and occupation of Yugoslavia, they all shared a common desire to consolidate their control of their newly acquired territories. In the case of occupied territories (as opposed to directly annexed territories) the Axis occupiers attempted to set up “Quisling administrations”, or puppet regimes. The occupiers also sought to fully exploit both the natural and labor resources that the conquered territories contained. The Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union followed shortly after the Yugoslavian campaign, and therefore a large number of Nazi troops left Yugoslavia. Additionally, half of the 200,000 member-strong Italian force in the former Yugoslavia also withdrew. After this large withdrawal of occupation forces open revolt broke out in Serbia, Montenegro, and Slovenia. Simultaneously with this resistance to the occupation, a civil war
emerged. A rivalry between Communists and Serbian National Fighters had existed in Yugoslavia prior to Axis occupation, and following the dissolution of the old institutions of government this rivalry burst into a full-scale civil war. The Allies initially supported the Serbian National Fighters, but as it became clear that the Communists were gaining an advantage the Allies transferred their support to the Communists, who were led by Tito. Tito met with the head of Soviet forces, and the task of liberating and securing Yugoslavia was given to his forces. From the 9th to the 12th of September 1944 the Anti-Fascist Assembly for the Peoples’ Liberation of Serbia, a Communist organization, convened. It contacted the other five Anti-Fascist Councils that had formed in the other ethnic territories of former Yugoslavia and agreed to form a Democratic Federative Yugoslavia. The Nazi and collaborationist forces continued to fight against the resistance forces, but they ultimately surrendered on 15 May 1945 in Trieste.

Romania

Target: Romania
Imposer: Soviet Union
Occupation: Yes
Social re-engineering: No

For the first part of the Second World War Romania had a very close relationship with Nazi Germany that was predicated on the Nazi need for oil and the Romanian need for protection against the Soviets. In the course of the war it became clear to the Romanians that the Nazis would be unable to win the war and provide them with the security that they so desperately desired vis-à-vis the Soviets. Therefore, the Romanians decided to switch sides and join the Allied fight against the Nazis with the hope that the United Kingdom and the United States would support Romania’s efforts to remain independent of Soviet influence. The Romanians informed the Germans that they were ending their alliance on 22 August 1944 and two days later the Luftwaffe began to bombard Bucharest.

As the Romanian army was engaged in driving the Nazis out of southeastern Europe, the Soviet army advanced into Romania. Instead of treating Romania as a country that was fighting on the same side, the Soviets occupied the country and demanded that the Romanians bear the associated costs. Under the Soviet occupation the main attributes of Romanian sovereignty were taken over by the occupation authorities. In a meeting between Stalin and Churchill it was agreed that Romania fell within the Soviet sphere of influence, and in keeping with this decision in March of 1945 the Soviets demanded that Petru Groza lead the Romanian government. The Groza government was controlled by the Soviets, and his administration the opposition parties soon began to lose influence, as was the case when Communists took over power regardless of
the country. Romanian resources were diverted to the Soviet Union through the establishment of “Sovroms”, or Soviet-Romanian joint companies.

After the Second World War was over, the peace negotiations that concerned Romania lasted from August 1946 to February 1947. Romania was denied co-belligerent status and was therefore treated as a collaborationist regime. The Soviets continued to exert pressure on the Romanian government to the point where King Michael abdicated his throne. On 21 February 1948 the Communist party forced the Social Democratic Party to merge with it and this “hybrid” political party then exclusive ruled Romania until 22 December 1989 when the Communist regime in Romania collapsed as it lost its Soviet backing.

Greece

Target: Greece
Imposer: Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy
Occupation: Yes
Social Re-engineering: No

Fascist Italy invaded Greece on 28 October 1940 following Greece’s refusal to allow Italian forces to occupy strategic locations within Greece. By December 1940 the Greeks had routed the Italian forces, driving them up into Albania and holding them there. Hitler could not allow the Greeks to defeat his Italian allies because the Balkans needed to be secure in order for the Nazi’s plan to invade the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa, could move forward. Therefore, on 6 April 1941 the Nazis launched their invasion of Greece. By the 20th of April the Nazis had managed to position their forces such that the Greek force that had been pinning down the Italian forces in Albania were now trapped between Axis forces. The Greek army was thus forced into surrender. The Nazis captured Athens on April 26th, which forced King George II, the prime minister, and the remnants of the Greek army to flee the country. That same day General Tsolakoglou of the Greek Army declared his willingness to serve Hitler and to form a government. The primary responsibilities of his collaborationist government were to maintain law and order, oversee the economic takeover of the country, and to coordinate with the occupying powers. The extent of collaboration on the part of Tsolakoglou’s government was such that it never receive international recognition.

After conquering Greece the Axis divided the country into zones of occupation. The Germans controlled Athens, Thessaloniki, Crete, the Thrakian border zone with Turkey, and several Aegean islands. The Bulgarians, who were allies with the Germans and the Italians, were given control of Thrake and eastern Macedonia. The remainder of the country placed under the control of the Italians. In addition to partitioning the country, the Germans also saw to it that a system was set-up to facilitate the exploitation of Greece’s natural resources for the benefit of the
Axis war cause. The Germans were particularly interested in supplying their industrial plant with Greek bauxite. The Greeks were also made to support the occupying forces with both foodstuffs and monetary compensation.

The Nazis began withdrawing from Greece in October of 1944. They wanted to be sure that they could exit the Balkans before the Soviet advance from the east closed off the route back to Germany. At the same time, on the 2nd of October, a train containing prominent Greek collaborationists left Athens. As soon as the heads of the collaborationist government and the troops which propped-up their regime left Greece, massive reprisals against collaborationists began throughout the country.

*Hungary*

Target: Hungary

Imposer: Soviet Union

Occupation: Yes

Social Re-engineering: No

Hungary had collaborated with the Nazis during the Second World War, and after they were driven out of Hungary by the Red Army, the Soviets occupied the country. An Allied Control Commission was established to oversee the country until elections could be held, and the Commission was headed by Marshal Kliment Voroshilov, a Soviet officer. Free elections were held in November of 1945 and the Smallholders party won 57 percent of the vote. The result of the election was unacceptable to Voroshilov, who used his influence as head of the Allied Control Commission to see to it that the Communists be included in the governing coalition even though they had not performed well in the elections. As the Cold War began to take shape after the end of the Second World War Stalin accelerated the process of “Sovietizing” the territories occupied by the Red Army in order to prepare for the eventuality that actual war could break out. It was in this context that the Communist party in Hungary began to slowly eliminate its rivals to power. The Communist power-grab in Hungary was facilitated by the continued presence of Soviet troops in the country even after the signing of the Paris Peace treaties on 10 February 1947. Other Allied troops began withdrawing within three months of the signing of the treaty, but the Soviets did not. The continued Soviet troop presence in Hungary was based on the claim that the Soviets needed secure lines of communication to their zone of occupation in Austria. Thus the Soviets were able to maintain their occupation of Hungary even after the peace had been concluded. With the backing of the Red Army the Hungarian Communists had managed to monopolize political power by the middle of 1949.

The Hungarian government obeyed Moscow for the next several years until Imre Nagy became Prime Minister. He began to lead Hungary down a path independent of Moscow to the
point where he was censured by Khrushchev in January 1955. He was eventually pushed out of office in April of that year. Nagy’s ouster outraged a number of intellectuals, who organized themselves and began to undermine the government. Nagy’s supporters were eventually able to bring about his return to office at the end of October, 1956 and he proceeded to take radical action to free Hungary of Soviet influence. On 1 November he announced Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, which had been formed the previous year by the Soviets in response to West Germany’s ascension to NATO. Anti-Communist agitation reached the point where Ernő Gerö, the head of the Communist party in Hungary, and other government officials requested Soviet intervention to stop Nagy and his reforms. Communist divisions moved into the city, and on 4 November 1956 they crushed Nagy’s reformist government, installed a new, compliant government, and then remained in Hungary until the end of the Cold War to ensure that the events of late fall 1956 did not repeat.

Germany

Target: Germany
Imoser: United States and the Soviet Union
Occupation: Yes
Social Re-engineering: Yes

Even before the Second World War was won the Allies had drawn up plans for the division of Germany into zones of occupation. Nazi troops surrendered to the Allies on the 7th and 8th of May 1945. As the Soviets advanced into Germany’s eastern frontier, they brought with them German Communists who would eventually become leaders of the Communist party in the Soviet zone of occupation. One of the first policies enacted by the Soviets in their zone was to require all political parties to apply for a license, with the idea behind this policy being the legitimization of the German Communist Party as it sought to gain control over all key positions in local government. Meanwhile in the zones occupied by Western powers similar regulations requiring the registration of political parties were enacted, but instead of providing support for the efforts of the Communist party, the Western regulations sought to ensure that all political parties operating in the Western zones were thoroughly democratic. The Allies all sought to reshape German society and cleanse it of Nazism and implemented a variety of policies and programs, such as re-education programs, to help attain this goal.

The three Western Allies encouraged representatives from their three zones to meet to begin to frame a constitution for the new German state. This resulted in the signing of the new German Grundgesetz, or Basic Law, by representatives of the West German territories on the 8th of May 1949 and the Federal Republic of Germany was formed. However, as Germany was still under the control of the Allies this new constitution had to be approved by them, which it was on the
23rd of May. The Basic Law was initially written to not allow for an army, however this provision was later revised so that the Germans could be allowed to have very limited armed forces. In response to the actions of the Western occupation powers, the Soviet Union allowed for the German Democratic Republic to be created on the 7th of October 1949.

In July of 1951 the western Allies declared that the state of war between them and the Federal Republic had ended, however there was way to negotiate a formal peace to end the war because there was no unified German government with which to negotiate a peace. Therefore, both the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic retained ambiguous status vis-à-vis the two occupying powers in spite of the fact that the occupation statute for the Federal Republic lapsed on 5 May 1955 and the fact that the Soviets declared in March of 1954 that the German Democratic Republic was the equal of the other Soviet satellite states. The two Germany’s were of critical importance for both the United States and the Soviet Union as they represented the forward-most position that either side could occupy. Therefore, for the duration of the Cold War there was a large Western troop presence in West Germany and a large Soviet troop presence in East Germany. The two Germany’s remained the focus of Cold War tensions until the Soviet Union abandoned the Brezhnev Doctrine, which justified the Soviet Union’s intervention in the affairs of other states. This change in Soviet policy allowed for the process of reunifying the two German states to begin, but before the reunification could become a reality, the powers which had defeated Germany in 1945 still had to agree to it because there was never any final settlement of the war before then.

Japan

Target: Japan
Imposer: United States
Occupation: Yes
Social Re-engineering: Yes

The Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945 ended the Second World War. Although Japan was technically occupied by all the Allies, it was the Americans who dominated the occupation machinery in Japan through the office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), which was headed by American General Douglas MacArthur. 300,000 troops entered Japan following its defeat, and the primary task of the occupation was to make sure that Japan never posed a military threat to the United States ever again. In order to realize this goal, SCAP implemented a program of reform that impacted all aspects of Japanese society such as politics, business, labor, education, and land. One of the pillars of the new Japanese society was the new Japanese constitution, which was drafted by a group of Americans and went into effect on 3 May 1947. Article Nine of the new constitution explicitly forbade military forces: “land,
sea, and air forces, as well as all other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized”.

The formal occupation of Japan lasted from August 1945 until April 1952, and in that time frame the SCAP supervised the elected Japanese governments. The San Francisco Peace Treaty was concluded in September of 1951 formally concluded the hostilities between Japan and the United States and its allies. At the same time, Japan and the United States negotiated a bilateral security pact. This pact allowed the United States to station troops in Japan for the purpose of maintaining peace and security in Asia, and Japan was obligated to partially defray the costs of maintaining these troops. Additionally the United States was allowed to defend Japan against external attack and could be called upon by the Japanese government to suppress domestic unrest. Essentially, the security pact between Japan and the United States amounted to the United States being the guarantor of the Japanese state from both foreign and domestic threats.

South Vietnam

Target: South Vietnam

Imposer: North Vietnam

Occupation: Yes

Social re-engineering: No

After the Second World War the French engaged in a colonial war in Indochina. Following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954 an international conference was called in Geneva. There it was decided that Vietnam would be partitioned until an election could be held in 1956. However, the United States, which had become increasingly involved in the hostilities, and the South Vietnamese preferred to see the partition made permanent. This partitioning was unacceptable to the North. The planned election was not held, and the conflict between North and South Vietnam was drawn out over the following two decades. By the time Richard Nixon was elected President of the United States in 1968 Americans had largely turned against the Vietnam War. Nixon therefore sought “peace with honor” and especially wanted to end the war prior to the 1972 presidential election. Beginning on 21 February, 1970 Nixon’s Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with Le Duc Tho of North Vietnam and began negotiations to end the war. At the same time that the negotiations were taking place, Nixon began to withdraw American troops from Vietnam, to the point that by 1972 over 400,000 troops had left Vietnam. This withdrawal was accompanied by a process called “Vietnamization” whereby American soldiers were replaced by Vietnamese ones. Although Vietnamese officers had received training both from in the United States itself and from American advisors in Vietnam, the South Vietnamese army was not competent and thus “Vietnamization” policy was not successful. This
and other factors lead Kissinger and other American advisors to realize that it would not be feasible to expect the North Vietnamese troops to withdraw from the South as the Americans had previously demanded. Therefore, on 8 October 1972 Kissinger and Le Duc Tho reached a tentative peace agreement whereby the North Vietnamese troops would not be required to withdraw from South Vietnam simultaneously with an American withdrawal but rather would be allowed to retain possession of the territory that they had captured in the South. The president of South Vietnam, Nguyen Van Thieu, realized that North Vietnamese troops in the South after the American withdrawal meant the end of South Vietnam and therefore publicly rejected this peace treaty on 24 October. This caused the North Vietnamese to walk away from the proposed peace treaty as well, but following a bombing campaign in the winter of 1972-1973 they returned to the negotiating table. The result of the renewed negotiations was very similar to the proposed peace treaty of the fall of 1972, but this time Thieu was forced to accept the treaty by the threat that the American Congress would cut-off the funding that the South Vietnamese regime depended on if it did not ratify the treaty. Thus on 27 January 1973 the treaty was signed by North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the United States. In the summer of 1973 the American Congress passed legislation that blocked funding for any American action in Indochina, thereby eliminating any means of defending South Vietnam should the North decide to resume aggression, which was its intention. In April 1973 the Central Intelligence Agency estimated that Northern Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam numbered approximately 150,000 troops and the Communists soon began building the infrastructure necessary to successfully prosecute a campaign against the South. This campaign began in the middle of December 1974, and in spite of repeated victories by the North there was minimal response from the United States. Thieu resigned the presidency on 21 April 1975 and fled to Taiwan. Then, on 30 April North Vietnamese forces enter Saigon, and later that morning General Minh, who had assumed leadership of the South Vietnamese government following Thieu’s resignation, surrendered South Vietnam to the North Vietnamese Colonel Bui Tin.

Lo, Hashimoto and Reiter acknowledge that the defeat of South Vietnam was immediately followed by its death. Their analysis observes a cease-fire dyad between two states, but in this case one of the states ceases to exist. This means that the regime of the victor state was imposed on the loser state, thus barring a complete failure of the victor state’s regime, the imposed regime on the defeated state will never fail. Additionally, state death can be viewed as the ultimate occupation in that one state is so thoroughly occupied that it loses all sovereignty and becomes completely and utterly dominated by the other state.

_Uganda_

Target: Uganda

Imposer: Tanzania

Occupation: Yes
Milton Obote became president of Uganda in 1966 whose administration was threatened by an increasing reliance on the military and the use of the police to terrorize his political rivals. On 25 January 1971 Idi Amin, commander of the Ugandan army, lead a successful coup d’etat against Obote while Obote was out of the country. Obote went into exile, Amin took assumed power, became Uganda’s president, and ushered in a number of brutal policies. These policies eventually antagonized the populace, and he also managed to alienate the army of which he had been the commander of by eliminating moderate commanders. In an effort to divert the tensions the army, Amin devised the plan to invade and annex a border zone of Tanzania known as the Kagera Salient. This action prompted the Tanzanian government to send the Tanzanian People’s Defense Force (TPDF) to drive the invading Ugandans out. The Tanzanian government was also sympathetic to the groups around Africa working to oust Amin, and therefore the Tanzanians decided on 14 November 1978 to invade Uganda and topple Amin and his regime. The Tanzanians found it necessary to slow their war against Amin’s forces because they were very anxious to make sure that it would be a Ugandan national government and not a Tanzanian military government that would replace Amin’s regime. On 10 April, 1979 the Ugandan capital of Kampala was taken and Amin feld to Tripoli. In order to maintain law and order approximately 40,000 Tanzanian troops remained in Uganda and the Ugandans had to pay for their up-keep. Between 1979 and 1980 Uganda had two presidents, Yusufu Lule and Godfrey Binaisa. Lule’s regime was only 68 days long because he was unable to forge a working relationship with the Uganda National Liberation Army and its political wing the Uganda National Liberation Front. Binaisa’s regime was not helped by the fact that he was perceived as a leader who was kept in office by the Tanzanians, and eventually he was put under house arrest by the Military Commission. On 10 December 1980 a general election was held that Obote won, thus becoming president of Uganda for the second time. By June 1981 most of the Tanzanian forces had withdrawn from Uganda and therefore Obote was unable to rely on them to help defend him against an increasing number of insurgents. These insurgents would ultimate oust him from office for the second time.

Idi Amin used the invasion and annexation of Tanzanian territory as a means to divert tensions in the army that could potentially lead to his ouster. Therefore, when the Tanzanians decided to drive the Ugandans out, they also decided to remove Amin from power so that he could not threaten Tanzanian security again. As was evidenced by their behavior during their military campaign, the Tanzanians were not concerned with establishing any specific regime in Uganda, and they especially did not want that regime to be Tanzanian. All they were concerned with was the removal of the threat posed by Amin. The Ugandan government after Amin was by no means stable, but Amin did not return to power. Granted this took place without the presence of Tanzanian troops. However, it is important to note that the Tanzanian troops did not attempt to establish a more democratic regime in Uganda, and thus the continued peace between Uganda
and Tanzania does not fit into Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter’s explanation that a democratic foreign-imposed regime makes post-war peace last longer than a non-democratic foreign-imposed regime.

Afghanistan

Target: Afghanistan

Imposer: United States

Occupation: Yes

Social Re-engineering: Yes

Following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 the United States initiated a war on terror whose first target was the regime of the Taliban in Afghanistan, which had been identified as the state sponsor of the terrorist group that carried out the attack on the United States. The United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban government in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. On the 13th of November US-led troops entered the Afghan capital of Kabul, and on the 22nd of December a ceremony was held to inaugurate the new interim Afghan government that was to replace the Taliban. This interim administration had the backing of the international community, and the United States and its allies pledged to aid Afghanistan in the establishment of a democratic government. From the 11th to the 19th of June 2002 a Loya Jirgah was convened to draft a constitution for the Transitional Administration that would govern Afghanistan until elections were held. This body was composed of diverse representatives, and it was only through the influence of the United States that factions did not develop and prevent the establishment of an interim government. Hamid Karzai became president of this interim government, and in 2004 he was elected the first president of Afghanistan.

While the American campaign was met with initial success, there still remains much to be accomplished in Afghanistan from a military point of view. To begin with, the Karzai government is not able to project its power much beyond Kabul, and the government lacks the money to rebuild Afghanistan’s infrastructure in order to facilitate the rehabilitation of the Afghan economy. The mountainous terrain of the country provides ready hide-outs for the remnants of Taliban and terrorist forces. The Afghan-Pakistan border is far from secure and provides a route for terrorist reinforcements to enter Afghanistan. The United States has established military bases in the country in order to continue the prosecuting the war against them.


